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Since its inception, the Internet started to offer alternative sources to mainstream news 
outlets and consistently provided a digital public sphere of contestation and counter-
narratives (Jayyusi and Roald 2016; Askanius 2012; Castells 2001). The Syrian upris-
ing, which started in 2011, is arguably the most (socially) mediated and video-recorded 
revolution of modern times, the most “YouTubed” war (Lynch et al, 2014; Elias and 
Omareen 2014; Al-Ghazzi 2014; Üngör 2013 and 2015; Boëx 2012). For decades, Syria 
was a closed media country (Al-Bunni 2008, George 2003, Wedeen 1999) and at the 
onset of the popular uprising, Syria became even more closed when foreign TV net-
works such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya were kicked out of the country early in the 
uprisings (Halasa 2014). To fill the media gap, thousands of Syrian street protesters 
used their mobile phones to record daily events to be uploaded on YouTube, which was 
banned in Syria until February 2011 (Wessels 2015b and 2011). Grass root video foot-
age has been hailed as a useful tool to document and evidence war crimes. But the chal-
lenges to compile a body of evidence of war crimes are significant (Koettl 2014). 
Providing a conceptual categorisation of online digital video in eight different types of 
footage found on YouTube, this article focuses on the value of digital video for future 
transitional justice in Syria. The research methodology is based on observation (media-
ethnography) of 400 YouTube clips, observational fieldwork in Turkey and Syria, 23 
                                                
6A draft version of this article was presented at the 3rd workshop of the exploratory series on ‘Virtual 
Zones of Peace and Conflict’ organised by the University of Copenhagen, Lund University, and the Peace 
Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), March 3-4 2016, Lund, Sweden. 
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semi-structured interviews with Syrian video activists inside and outside Syria and con-
versations with legal (media) experts. 
 
Videos as expressions of moral outrage, grieving death, digital memories and 
evidence of war crimes 
 
For Syrian video activists, YouTube provides an online platform to deposit and distrib-
ute their videos, to find a global audience to express their moral outrage and to build an 
archive of action and activist memory, for commemoration, for grieving death, and 
honouring heroes and beloved ones. Askanius (2012) identified three major roles for 
online videos on anti-capitalist video activism: 1) an archive of action and activist 
memory, 2) commemoration in an online environment for grieving death and 3) a space 
to provide and negotiate visual evidence of police violence and state repression: “Vast 
amounts of videos documenting street violence and narrating political resistance from a 
citizen gaze are uploaded onto YouTube everyday” (Askanius, 2012, 13). Askanius 
(2012) draws upon Haskins (2007) who argues that digital memory bridges the conven-
tional distinction between archival memory and lived memory by merging storage func-
tions and ordering, to indicate that YouTube in particular is where amateur culture and 
user creativity meets history writing and archival documentation in an audio-visual 
online archive (Askanius 2012; Haskins 2007). This article takes into account the func-
tion of YouTube as a platform for digital memory and the three major roles of activist 
videos as identified by Askanius (2012), whilst posing the following question: What is 
the value of the available user generated video content (UGC) on YouTube in the con-
stitution of legal evidence for Transitional Justice? To answer this question, the article 
is divided in four sections; the first section describes the emergence and development of 
online video content from Syria, why activists started to record and upload their videos 
on YouTube, the role of digital video in media discourses about ‘truth’ in the Syrian 
war and the transformation of online videos as evidence.  The second section analyses 
how digital video from Syria has been introduced in the human rights discourses on the 
‘power of the camera’ and ‘citizen journalists’ as eyewitnesses of atrocities. What are 
the guidelines for digital video as evidence? This section critically reflects on how the 
evidentiary value of digital media is emphasized and can lead to a false sense of the 
power of the video camera. The third section unravels a categorisation of the many dif-
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ferent types of online video clips available on YouTube since 2011 in relation to the 
Syrian conflict, based on a media-ethnography of 400 online YouTube clips that were 
surveyed between 2014 and 2015. Finally, in the fourth section, the video categorisation 
of the third section will be used to assess the value of the available UGC on YouTube in 
the constitution of legal evidence for Transitional Justice. 
 
Emergence and transformation of online digital video from Syria 
 
Due to the lack of media presence in Syria, protesters began to take their own photos 
and videos of the events, which coincided with the emergence of revolutionary Local 
Coordination Committees (LCCs) throughout the country. LCCs are civil society 
groups across cities and towns that tried to organise the flurry of grassroots media activ-
ism (Halasa 2014; Khalaf et al. 2014). Since 2011, more than 300.000 video clips from 
Syria are estimated to have been uploaded on the internet (Wessels 2015b, Wessels 
2014, Elias and Omareen 2014). For many video activists on the ground, the primary 
reason why they started filming was to “tell the world” what was happening in their 
neighbourhood (Wessels 2015b). 
 
“I didn’t think of using my video collection as evidence, this was not the thing 
on my mind when I started filming. I filmed my feelings and wanted to docu-
ment my neighbourhood, my area. I filmed a lot of injured people and martyrs 
and bombings but not with in the back of my mind to be able to use it as evi-
dence. But I think there is so much around now that it should be possible to 
provide evidence and incriminate everyone who has committed crimes, we 
know who threw the bombs and at what time and how” - Video activist from 
Zabadani  
 
Filming to “tell the word”, can be understood in a variety of ways and does not neces-
sarily indicate a desire to build an archive of legal evidence. First, the fact that interna-
tional media access was extremely limited to the areas where activists lived, motivated 
many of them to pick up a camera. Second, some activists picked up a camera when 
they themselves experienced and observed direct violence of the war, such as aerial 
bombardments or sniper fire. The filming could be explained as expressions of moral 
outrage whereby the filmed use the camera as tool to direct their rage to the perpetrators 
and the outside world. Moral outrage is a special type of anger, caused by the observa-
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tion of the mistreatment of others, violation of their rights and the violation of a moral 
norm or principle (not to hurt, rape, kill, bomb or shoot at others) by others, which then 
motivates the observer to speak up and take action (Goodenough 1997). When moral 
outrage about a war crime is mutually felt between Syrians and publics outside Syria, 
this emotion can unite people in defiance and protest. Thirdly, another reason that moti-
vated Syrian video activists was the sudden occurrence of extra-ordinary events in their 
daily life. Bourdieu and Whiteside (1996) theorised about the use of everyday photog-
raphy and found that the ‘photographable’ is directly associated to extra-ordinary events 
that occur in routine daily-life marking a break from it; i.e. a holiday, a wedding or a 
funeral. When applied in the Syrian context, extra-ordinary events like a street protest, a 
funeral or an aerial bombardment motivated filming. During the first phase of the Syri-
an revolution, filming happened spontaneously and reactionary, no specific documenta-
tion strategy was prepared (Halasa 2014). The majority of the YouTube footage in the 
first period of the Syrian uprisings consists of activist recordings of street protests to 
serve as a digital memory of a unique revolutionary event and not specifically as legal 
evidence. Early UGC can thus be seen as Bourdieusian everyday photography of extra-
ordinary events. These videos also correlate with the first role that Askanius (2012) 
identifies as online videos being an archive of action and activist memory to document 
the street protests. 
      When the events turned violent and the regime crackdown deepened, using live 
ammunition and bombings, the videos went beyond everyday photography or activist 
memory and became tools to express moral outrage and eventually document the suffer-
ing and consistent war crimes. This relates to the two other roles identified by Askanius 
(2012), namely a digital vehicle to commemorate martyrs and grief death and a space to 
provide and negotiate visual evidence of violence and repression. Videos of funerals 
and extreme violence increasingly started to appear online (Üngör 2013), armed opposi-
tion groups would capture regime thugs (a.k.a. shabihha7), who carried personal 
phones. Mobile phone footage from shabihha contained self-recorded and/or perpetrat-
ed torture and violence against civilians or Free Syrian Army fighters, which was con-
sequently uploaded on YouTube to provide evidence (Bashar Assads Crimes Archive 
                                                
7 šabbīḥa (arab. translit.) means “ghost” or “spirit” in Arabic and is used to describe the mostly Alawite 
secret militias in support of the Assad-led Ba’ath party. The militias have been active since the eighties in 
Syria as irregular paramilitaries in civilian clothes connected to the Assad regime (Üngör 2013).  
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2013). For example, the YouTube channel ‘Syrian Revolution in Languages of the 
World is an anti-Assad channel that uploaded mobile phone footage from captured As-
sad regime soldiers and other self-incriminating video evidence of war crimes perpetrat-
ed by the regime army (Bashar Assads Crimes Archive 2 2013). Opposition video activ-
ists would also film and document the aftermath of aerial bombardments and massacres, 
such as those in Houla in 2012 (Syria Scenes 2012; Van Schaak 2014), Ariha market 
and Rasm al Nafl in 2013 (Shahba Press Agency 2013). Digital video footage also 
emerged documenting armed rebel groups committing human rights violations such as 
torture, summary execution of prisoners and beheadings.  
      Sometimes YouTube uploads primarily served as intimidating messages to victims; 
the clearest case in Syria were the videos by Syrian regime supporters of summary exe-
cutions of rebels (often called ‘nusra terrorist rats’ and other animal references) or jihadi 
videos by ISIS, Jabhat al Nusra and other extremist factions, of beheadings uploaded by 
perpetrators themselves to intimidate their victims. What is clear from the videos is that 
violence is committed in Syria by all sides in the conflict. The regime has been employ-
ing a kaleidoscope of violence which has been documented by video activists, including 
sniper fire, executions, massacres, tortures to death, detention and indiscriminate bom-
bardment using a wide range of weaponry from chemical weapons, cluster bombs, scud 
rockets, incendiary bombs and barrel bombs (Üngör 2013 and 2015). Consistent denial 
is a key element in the media discourse of the regime (Üngör 2013). YouTube videos of 
regime staged interviews are introduced in online media discourses, they become vehi-
cles to claim a ‘truth’ about what is really happening on the ground in Syria, to counter 
and debunk the opposition-activists uploads leading to a battle of the digital images 
online and vice versa. The main argument introduced by Assad-supporters against UGC 
by opposition video activists is that their videos are faked; therefore do not provide 
proof or evidence of war crimes perpetrated by the regime. 
      However, Syrian state media and indeed Assad himself during media interviews 
both with foreign news agencies and pro-Assad Syrian channels such as Al Dounia TV, 
regularly refer to Syrian military operations as national cleansing operations, as de-
scribed by President Bashar al Assad himself as “internal self-cleansing for the state 
first and then for the country in general” (Addounia TV English 2012) which indicates 
genocidal justification. When analysing video clips and YouTube content of channels 
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supportive of the regime, much of the rhetoric is indeed focused on the utter destruction 
of the opponents of the regime. These opponents are dehumanised and labelled as ter-
rorists, vermin, cockroaches, beasts, apes and pigs (Üngör 2013). The regime supporters 
morally justify the mass violence they unleashed onto Syrian civilians as the only way 
to purify the country from these opponents.  
      Digital video has thus become a central tool in media discourses about which 
“truth” in the Syrian conflict prevails, between those supportive of the Assad regime, 
the secular opposition against the Assad regime and the more extremist factions such as 
Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State militants, whereby those supportive of the Assad 
regime try to portray all those in the opposition as terrorists and Islamic extremists. 
Making use of social media, YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and Instagram, the pro-Assad 
digital communications campaign works around the clock in teams to insert counter-
narratives, ignoring, denying war crimes and repudiating grass root videos coming from 
besieged and bombarded rebel held areas in Syria (Prati 2015). In interviews for inter-
national media networks with Assad’s media advisor and spokesperson, Buthaina Sha-
baan consistently denies any wrongdoing by the Syrian regime and emphasizes that the 
regime is focused on securing the country (BBC Newsnight 2016). On the regime’s 
website, the collection of interviews with the Western Media portrays the Syrian presi-
dent himself as secular, socialist, democratic, kind, loving, strong, open, modern, most 
of all, supported by his people (Al Assad 2011). 
     But a ‘truth’ in a digital video does not necessarily reflect reality and in some cases 
digital video has indeed been blatantly faked. One of the advantages of online and social 
media is the immediate verification of content by many different online actors (Twitter, 
Reddit, Facebook users). One of the most recent examples is an interview with a sup-
posed jihadi extremist from the Al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al Nusra by the German journal-
ist Todenhofer on 17th September 2016, which was aired by Russian State Television 
(Russian Television 2016). Online activists and Reddit users (Syrian Civil War 2016) 
and other investigative journalists (Zaman al Wasl 2016) quickly exposed the interview 
as having been staged inside regime controlled territory with a regime supportive com-
mander dressed up as a Jabhat al Nusra leader.   
      The Syrian revolt has led to possibly the widest range of digital and social media 
content produced, reproduced, rehashed and distributed through a variety of actors rang-
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ing from political activists, witnesses, military staff, torturers, foreign media profession-
als and many more providing a vast archive of visual material that is of great scholarly 
importance (Üngör 2015; Ghazzi 2014). The recordings of violence that can be consid-
ered crimes against humanity have tremendous value for the sociological study of mass-
violence and the role of perpetrators because the type of footage is unprecedented and 
many perpetrators are visible (Üngör 2015). In the transformation of online UGC from 
Syria from spontaneous videos of extra-ordinary revolutionary events to recordings of 
mass violence as evidence, international human rights organisations such as Human 
Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Witness, have worked tirelessly to collect and 
assess digital video as evidence. 
 
Online digital video as a ‘game changer’ for evidencing war crimes  
 
UGC videos from Syria have been introduced in media and human rights discourses as 
having an enormous potential to provide legal documentation for future war crimes tri-
bunals (Cole 2012; Koettl 2014; Matheson 2016). But there is a difference between a 
‘video recording’ and a ‘legal truth’ and both do not necessarily coincide. This requires 
a critical discussion of the production of ‘legal truth’ and ‘legal evidence’. In their arti-
cle on the work of human rights NGOs in refugee camps in Chad to collect evidence of 
war crimes in Darfur, Aradau and Hill (2013) discuss the role of 500 children’s draw-
ings for an analysis of visuality and conflict, navigating humanitarian and legal realm 
(Aradau and Hill 2013). The International Criminal Court accepted these drawings as 
contextual evidence for war crime trials against Sudanese officials. What is important to 
realize is that the children’s drawings per se do not constitute legal evidence but in 
combination with the interviews done by workers of Human Right Watch with children-
witnesses and corroboration with other evidencing visuals such as photography and sat-
ellite imagery the visuals are extremely valuable (Aradau and Hill 2013).  Only then, 
the drawings have a potential to serve as evidence for Transitional Justice. A similar 
challenge can be identified for the use of UGC on YouTube. 
      Transitional Justice is generally accepted as a key step in future peace building and 
conflict transition (Gready 2005; Kaminski and Nalepa 2006; Sandoval Villalba 2011). 
According to the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) Transitional Jus-
tice refers to: 
Politik  Nummer 4 | Årgang 19 | 2016 
 
 37 
“a set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by 
different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights 
abuses. These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, 
reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms.” (ICTJ 
2016) 
 
Due to the practical challenges, most Transitional Justice organizations plea for holistic 
approaches that encompass and consider a full range of factors and circumstantial 
events and fact recordings that may have contributed to the violations and abuses. The 
general consensus is that there is no single solution for Transitional Justice.  
      In the case of Syria, several initiatives for Transitional Justice are documenting hu-
man right violations and war crimes; the UN’s Independent International Commission 
of Inquiry into human rights violations in Syria, the Violations Documentations Center 
and the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre8 (SJAC) (IRIN 2012). The latter con-
sists of Transitional Justice experts and practitioners, and was set up specifically to pro-
vide guidance on Transitional Justice and documentation issues. The SJAC facilitates a 
network of Syrian organizations working on documenting violations, accountability, 
transitional justice, and supporting a democratic transition in Syria. The SJAC “collects 
and preserves documentation of violations of human rights, humanitarian, and interna-
tional criminal law in Syria in order to facilitate transitional justice and accountability 
efforts” (SJAC 2016). The objectives of the SJAC are three-fold: 1) to remind perpetra-
tors that they will be held accountable one day, 2) to prevent recurrence of war-crimes 
in a future Syria and 3) to ensure the narratives of the victims are documented for Tran-
sitional Justice and historical archives. Within the framework of Transitional Justice, the 
SJAC open-software database archives videos, pictures, documents and Syria-specific 
meta-data such as source, location, time, types and methods of violations and actors 
involved, with both Arabic and English interfaces. Visuals are important entries in the 
SJAC database: When a Syrian photographer known as ‘Caesar’ defected from the As-
sad regime with 55,000 photographs of more than 11,000 victims of systematic torture 
by the Syrian security forces, a renewed call for transitional justice in Syria emerged 
                                                
8 Set up by Syrian activists and international experts in exile, the SJAC registered in 2013 as a non-profit 
organisation based in the Hague, the Netherlands and also established an office in Washington D.C. The 
locations are strategically located at the geographical centres of international legal (International Criminal 
Court) and political power (U.S. State Department).  SJAC’s mission is to promote justice and accounta-
bility in Syria and ensure a Syrian state defined by justice, respect for human rights and for all Syrian 
citizens to live in a society without fear.    
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which focused on indictment of the Syrian Assad regime officials and leadership 
(Deknatel 2014). The existence of the SJAC opens up an opportunity for the enormous 
number of online videos from Syria to be considered as potential evidence of war 
crimes.  
      Cole (2012) emphasizes that most important for documenting violence and human 
rights abuses is the recording of proof of the date, time and geographical location (meta-
tagging) in order to verify and corroborate crucial facts in the video.  With the use of 
smartphones, Cole (2012) assesses, citizens are increasingly equipped with technology 
to push for accountability. Western narratives initially framed and celebrated citizen 
journalism and digital video activism in repressive contexts as ultimate vehicles for mo-
bilisation and democratisation, in the end leading to social justice for the victims of the 
oppression (Ghazzi 2014). However, this argument, which has been greatly pushed by 
international media and organisations working on human rights and democratisation, 
can also create a false sense of protection from a phone or a camera. This has led to the 
unfortunate deaths of Syrian video activists and amateurs who have taken great personal 
risks to document the Syrian war, such as the death of Molhem Barakat, an 18-year old 
activist in Aleppo who got killed whilst covering a battle between the Syrian army and 
the rebels for Reuters news agency (Ghazzi 2014; Kenner 2014). Within the Syrian con-
text, the video camera has not given protection neither led to accountability of perpetra-
tors (yet), despite the somewhat utopian belief in the power of the camera as a weapon 
against oppression and authority, as propagated in western discourse on the importance 
of digital media.  
      Ghazzi (2014) criticizes the construct of citizen journalism as a panacea for democ-
ratisation in Arab countries and argues that the conceptualization of digital media prac-
tices through a modernist Western discourse fails to take into account the deadly chal-
lenges citizens face within the context of the Syrian uprising. Another aspect is a false 
sense of the value, credibility and leverage that UGC from Syria has with Western me-
dia and legal institutions. Indeed, Syrian video activists, whilst they are convinced of 
the credibility of the footage, have encountered resistance with international human 
rights organisations to take their video footage seriously. They became utterly disap-
pointed over the years and expressed a lack of trust in the international community: 
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“I think the videos going out from Aleppo are all credible. But human rights 
organizations are closing their ears and eyes. They do not want to see the re-
ality that is happening in Aleppo (…) They do not want to believe, they want 
to contradict the video. We give them a video, they try to falsify it. Although 
the video is so real but they do not want to think or believe the reality that 
there is a criminal in this world whose criminality has reached to an extent of 
killing for example in a short time more than 50,000 citizens and displaced 
over 1.5 million from Aleppo city. They do not want to know the truth.  If 
they believe this truth and acknowledge it, Bashar al Assad would have been 
ousted. They are not ready to oust Bashar al Assad because they have inter-
ests with him” – Video activist from Aleppo 
 
“The problem is that the video clips are used by all the organizations. Videos 
are the most used thing now and I mean the human [rights] organizations 
they use this regularly. The basic tools are the videos taken by us, the media 
activists. But the problem is that the international community does not have a 
serious desire to hold the criminals accountable. They are not serious in 
[working] to hold the criminals accountable (…) they have enough evidenc-
es, whether with videos or other than videos but they do not have the will, 
they are not serious to hold the regime accountable as a criminal or [anyone] 
other that it [the regime]” – Video activist from Azzaz  
 
To help journalists, activists and researchers verify YouTube videos, Amnesty Interna-
tional launched a website, called the ‘citizen evidence lab’ (Amnesty International 
2016). The citizen evidence lab contains all kinds of tools such as the You Tube Data 
viewer, which allows researchers and activists to extract data from a video-clip such as 
the exact timing of upload, location and whether other copies of the same clips exist on 
YouTube. Another useful tool for journalists and activists to use is the verification 
handbook for digital content produced by the European Journalism Centre in order to 
sort out authentic material from fakes (Silverman 2014). Koettl (2016) and Matheson 
(2016) both argue that open source UGC content can be instrumental in evidencing hu-
man rights abuse on the condition that proper fact-finding methodologies are applied. In 
his latest article for the Centre of Governance and Human Rights at the University of 
Cambridge, Koettl (2016) states that the shift to digital technology to store and distrib-
ute information and the rise of digital images and videos from unofficial observers such 
as bystanders, video activists, armed actors, shared through social media provide im-
mense opportunities and at the same time challenges for human rights practitioners 
(Koettl 2016). Smartphones in combination with social networks constitute a game-
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changer for research and human rights advocacy, according to Koettl (2016). He sug-
gests the following analytical framework to provide guidance for human rights re-
searchers using YouTube videos. 
 
Table 1 Analytical framework to verify UGC on YouTube (Koettl 2016) 
 
Step Task How? 
Prerequisite Secondary trauma prevention Self-care plan  
1 Material collection and preservation Save & Download 
Archive 
2 Metadata review Free software online 
YouTube data viewer 
3 Verification of provenance and source Locate unique identifi-
er(s) 
Cached websites 
4 Content analysis: landmarks, language, 
dialect, season, date, symbols, uniforms, 
clothing, license plates, signs, names, 
streets, other recording devices in the 
image 
Frame-by-frame 
Watch in slow motion 
 
5 Optional: expert consultation Hiring forensic experts 
6 Integration with other research Corroboration 
7 Professional Standard Considerations ICRC guidelines 
 
Prior to verification and observation of video content containing evidence for war 
crimes and extreme violence, a self-care plan to prevent secondary trauma with desk 
researchers should be in place. Until recently, secondary trauma was an under-
recognised challenge of the human rights work with videos (Dubberly et al 2015). The 
first step is the collection of material and its preservation whereby the material collected 
is specifically focused on the recording of human rights violations. Witness has devel-
oped an elaborate process on how to download, save and archive video for human 
rights, which requires a sophisticated method of cataloguing and back-up (Matheson 
2016).  
      The next step is a meta-data review, including the sourcing of timestamps and GPS 
data (often removed when the video is edited and uploaded on YouTube) and triangula-
tion. The third step is verification of provenance and source. Evaluating the credibility 
of a source is at the core of human rights fact finding and YouTube videos are no excep-
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tion (Koettl 2016). Triangulation with other contextual data and remote sensing and 
other online media accounts, Twitter, Instagram, Google Maps that include meta-data 
are important in this step but also expert knowledge on languages, cultural dress, and 
location. For example, in the Syrian case, it has happened often that photographs and 
videos from Aleppo were remediated and re-circulated as being evidence videos of aeri-
al bombardments of the Israeli summer offensive in Gaza. However it was clear that in 
the specific video footage, the men were speaking the Arabic dialect from Aleppo, they 
were dressed with typical Syrian headdress and fore mostly, the people were wearing 
winter clothes whilst the Gaza offensive took place in the summer. This also brings us 
to step four in the process content analysis, which is complemented with step five, the 
expert analysis. Step six is focused on integration with other research on the same event, 
including witness testimonies and geographical data analysis. Corroboration yields the 
highest results if this is done in combination with both traditional as well as innovative 
fact-finding methods. The final step, is to adhere to professional and ethical standards 
concerning the use of video for human rights and protection work. Informed consent, 
privacy and anonymity of victims depicted in the video material and other ethical con-
siderations are important, specifically if the video deals with sexual violence and tor-
ture. 
      Verified video footage indeed helps in establishing that a crime has happened, but 
corroborated evidence is needed to legally establish who was responsible for the specif-
ic crime in the footage, where the act took place and who is the victim or group of vic-
tims. Preserving and archiving all footage from Syria is of crucial importance for Tran-
sitional Justice and several human rights organisations, Syrian lawyers and activists are 
currently compiling numerous files of possible evidence. One Syrian-led initiative, the 
‘Syrian Archive’ provides an online violation database of systematically archived and 
verified YouTube clips (Syrian Archive 2015). However, Syrian activists with 
smartphones pushing for accountability in Transitional Justice may still have a long 
road to get the perpetrators prosecuted and convicted (Cole 2012). Citizen video is in-
creasingly used as evidence of serious crimes, yet no standard protocol for authenticat-
ing exists (Bair 2012) and the use of video for war crimes tribunals has until now been 
very limited. Witness, a New York-based human rights organisation has developed a 
first field guide for the use of video to record human rights violations in 2016 (Mathe-
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son 2016) and within journalism, Silverman’s Verification Handbook for Digital Con-
tent (Silverman 2014) has been used to verify amateur videos. The handbook provides a 
step-by-step guide for how to deal with user generated content (UGC) during emergen-
cies, verification of these kind of video clips consists of a mix of three main factors: a 
person's resourcefulness and sources' knowledge, documentation, and the number of 
sources willing to talk about the recorded event. 
 
Results: Categorisation, From Trophy Videos to Puppet Sarcasm 
 
To reflect on the central question of this paper about the legal value of UGC from Syria, 
we need to address how the archive of YouTube videos from Syria performs against an 
assessment of the verification guidelines described above. For this study, a conceptual 
thematic categorisation of eight different video-categories has been developed, based on 
observation, media-ethnography and regular monitoring of YouTube material coming 
out of Syria since 2011 and in-depth surveillance of YouTube material uploaded be-
tween 2014 and 2015. In total 400 YouTube video clips were surveyed, analysed and 
monitored between 2014 and 2015 (See Table 1). It is believed that these eight different 
categories cover most of the themes and types of videos that have been produced about 
the Syrian uprising and war violence since 20119. 
 
Table 2 Syrian You Tube Video Categorisation observed and surveyed between 2014 
and 2015 (#clips) 

















































(30) (15) (65) (40) (40) (80) (80) (50) 
                                                
9 The author does not pretend that the described categorisation is fully comprehensive and extensive. 
Therefore the typography will certainly have an overlap with other typographies that are applied in vari-
ous studies on audio-visual media in and about Syria. This categorisation has left out semi-professional 
and professional documentaries of feature length, which are similarly uploaded on platforms like 
YouTube, however this is a special kind of category covering Syria and will be discussed in other texts 
that will be published from this postdoctoral study.   
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1. Humour and Creative Non-Violent Resistance: these edited videos are created in a 
humorous style to mock the Syrian regime as a form of non-violent resistance and coun-
ter-narrative. Humour has been an effective method for Syrian to counter authoritarian-
ism (Wedeen 2013). The creative resistance in Syria ranges from cartoons, animations 
and puppet shows to theatrical performances and remixes of uploaded video material 
and television interviews (Wessels 2015a). Material has also been uploaded that mock 
the Jihadi and ISIS groups. This category thus provides a good insight to the various 
techniques of non-violent activism and resistance against all forms of oppression using 
YouTube as a platform to create a counter-public against authority.  
     2. Protest videos from the first phase of the uprisings: these videos are mainly activ-
ist footage of the early demonstrations and funerals that took place in Damascus, De-
ra’a, Douma, Homs and Idlib recorded on mobile phones and digital cameras. This cat-
egory is a stand-alone category due to the format of the amateur video clips and the 
relatively systematic presentation that these videos display. The recorded event, whether 
a street demonstration or a public funeral, is often shot in an unedited wide shot not 
longer than 5 minutes. The shot is introduced by a handwritten or printed A4-sheet held 
in front of the camera with the Syrian revolutionary three star flag or logo of the Syrian 
National Council (SNC), stating the location and the date, often read out loud by the 
videographer who narrates the rest of the video clip. The video clip depicts dancing 
crowds, slogans of the Syrian revolution, songs and in the case of funerals, the carrying 
of the body in the crowds.  
      3. Torture and War Crimes: the videos in this category are intended as possible evi-
dence for human rights violations and war crimes. Videos display activities of torture 
recorded by perpetrators themselves, recordings of summary executions and unlawful 
arrests, secretly filmed by citizens or defected soldiers and also include mobile phone 
footage captured from mobile phones of army personnel and officers, videos made by 
Free Syrian Army, ISIS, Jihadi and other factions recording torture and executions. The 
category also includes self-incriminating ‘trophy videos’ taken by perpetrators them-
selves. All of the videos in this category are 18+ videos where murder, execution, be-
heading and severe torture is documented. Even though the majority of these videos are 
in violation of YouTube channel policy on material too gruesome to be shown, a large 
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collection of such videos remain online and have not been removed by YouTube. Most 
footage in this category is amateur material filmed on mobile phones. 
      4. Direct Frontline Battle Experience: these videos are uploaded by several warring 
parties; from the Syrian Arab Army, Free Syrian Army, Jihadi factions such as ISIS, 
Jaish al Islam and Jabhat al Nusra, and Russian Army. The footage originates from 
ground troops present on the ground in Syria wearing small cameras, GoPro cameras on 
tanks or helmet cams to record their direct frontline battle experience. Foreigners 
fighting inside the Syrian battlefield have also uploaded video material. Interestingly we 
also found clips that document “moments of peace at the battlefront” such as conversa-
tions between enemies trying to persuade each other party to defect (Baynetna 2013). 
Most of the video clips are amateur footage and consist of sequences of integral footage 
in some case over 30 minutes of unedited battlefront material. 
      5. Citizen experience of war: these videos document direct experiences of violence 
and war by citizens such as the aftermath of aerial bombings, grief and destruction. It 
consists mainly of amateur footage, but the longer the Syrian uprising has lasted, the 
more sophisticated the videos have become, more edited and its producers became more 
professionalized. Young media activists and citizen journalists started to edit their video 
material. Some of these video activists organized themselves in media centres dotted 
around the country. The videos in this category are targeted to Syrian audiences and are 
mostly in Arabic with the occasional English subtitles. 
      6. Pro-Assad media: conventional pro-Assad media also use YouTube channels as 
an outlet and include non-regime, but pro-Assad channels such as Addounia and Syri-
aNews, but also Assad-dedicated YouTube channels such as Syria Truth Network, 
Truth Syria, and Syrian Arab Nationalist. Other material in this category comes from 
foreign Assad-related media and political allies such as Hezbollah and foreign-based 
conspiracy theorists YouTube channels such as Syrian Girl Partisan, who has been out-
spokenly pro-Assad. State media YouTube channels from Russia and Iran, such as RT 
and PressTV also fall under this category. All of these videos are edited.  
      7. Anti-Assad Media: YouTube also includes new anti-Assad media centres such as 
the channels for the Free Syrian Army, Al Ghad TV, Free Media Syria, Free Syria Rev 
2011 and the more established Orient TV, Ugarit TV and FNN Syria News, the Syrian 
Media Centre, the Aleppo Media Centre, Nour Media and Media Centre of Syrian Rev-
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olution.  The anti-Assad media channels and rebel stations are staffed with professional 
journalists, video journalists and young citizen journalists from all walks of life.  
      8. Jihadi eschatology: This last group is a special type of category that includes the 
YouTube videos and channels by apocalyptic Islamic extremist factions both from Sun-
ni and Shia eschatological movements and their armed actors active inside the Syrian 
battlefront. Syria forms a mythical and symbolic location in Islamic eschatology and as 
such, Syria’s crisis has inspired jihadis, both Sunni and Shia, to come to Syria and fight 
a holy apocalyptic Islamic war within the framework of an end-time theory to usher in 
the coming and return of the Mahdi (the prophesied redeemer of Islam). Eventually the-
se jihadis believe that Islamic domination of the world will prevail over all evil. This 
category contains videos produced by Jihadi factions such as Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS 
but also Iranian and Hezbollah jihadi groups and material uploaded by foreign Jihadi 
fighters inside Syria. It consists mainly of jihadi videos and sermons, long footage of 
experiences of foreign jihadis and accompanying videos to justify their cause and jihadi 
recruitment videos. 
      The eight categories described above provide a useful analytical categorisation 
through which the vast collection of YouTube videos about Syria can be observed. For 
these categories we considered which type of digital video could have value for provid-
ing legal evidence of war crimes. What are the criteria? 
 
 
Results: verifiability and legal potential of YouTube videos for Transitional Jus-
tice 
 
Having devised a systematic categorisation of eight different categories to study 
YouTube videos about Syria, the question arises which categories are most likely to 
include clips that can contribute to Transitional Justice as legal evidence? Let us review 
the eight different categories in our categorisation (Table 2) in the light of verifiability, 
sourcing and corroboration for evidencing war crimes (Table 1). 	
      The first category concerns creative non-violent resistance. According to the 7-
step verification process described above, none of the surveyed videos and material in 
this category could be verified by the mere fact that content has been remixed, edited 
and constructed. All of the YouTube clips in this category are stripped of their original 
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metadata. Unless combined with triangulation and interviews with the owner of the ma-
terial, the actual videographer, producer or production team of the video, solely using 
the video output of creative digital online resistance is not enough to verify these 
YouTube clips reliable data. The second category deals with videos from the first 
phase of the uprisings. These clips have some successful chance of verification. Many 
of these clips have not been edited and contain their original meta-data. The recordings 
document the events that happened and in some of the clips, the videographer holds up 
a sheet where the date, location and type of event a written either in Arabic or English 
or both. However, it remains difficult to verify whether the information on the sheet is 
correct unless it is possible to triangulate the paper with metadata (GPS position and 
date) of the original recordings. The third category of YouTube video clips concerns 
torture and war crimes video documentation. Indeed many of the clips monitored dur-
ing this survey could form complementary evidence of war crimes to a certain degree. 
Matheson (2016; 2014) identifies main distinctions regarding types of legal evidence 
for which video could be used (New Tactics in Human Rights 2014): 
 
• Lead Evidence – suggests a crime may have been committed 
• Prima Facie Evidence – key fact established 
• Corroborative Evidence – backs up other types of evidence 
• Contextual Evidence – armed conflict or not  
• Inferential Evidence – perpetrator’s intent 
• Character Evidence – information about the perpetrator in other videos 
• Notice Evidence – informed by media about the event 
• Exculpatory Evidence – alibi for the defendant 
• Crime-based Evidence – proves the commission of a crime 
• Linkage Evidence – proves who committed the crime 
 
Providing verification can be carried out correctly of the torture and war crimes video 
clips, these YouTube clips have potential to function as legal evidence because the clips 
show and might establish that a crime took place. But many questions can still be raised 
whether the video clip legally proves the commission of a crime as crime-based evi-
dence. In all clips of this category, there is a very low probability that video clips from 
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this category can function as crime-based evidence. To function as linkage evidence, i.e. 
proving who committed the crime, the probability of the validity of the video clips in 
this category is also very low because either the perpetrator is not present in the video 
clip or unrecognisable. Even with self-incriminating video clips, done by the perpetrator 
him- or herself, the chance of using this clip as linkage evidence is low. Self-
incriminating video and photographic material whereby the narcissist torturer and abus-
er films himself committing the crime, so-called ‘torture selfies’ or trophy videos’ 
found on the perpetrator’s mobile phone, have the highest chance for verifiability and 
for functioning as linkage evidence. Video clips in this third category have also some 
probability to function as lead evidence suggesting a crime took place and can function 
as corroborative evidence.  
      The direct frontline battle video clips surveyed during this study usually contain 
their meta-data, which can be verified. However, for them to function as legal evidence 
for war crimes is very difficult. The actual perpetrator is rarely recognizable and the 
video clips consist of many hours of tank battle for example. Unless the owner of the 
helmet cam can be identified and providing that the helmet cam of GoPro documents a 
war crime, this UGC on YouTube can be relatively well verified but cannot function as 
legal evidence of war crimes. 
      Citizen experience of war and violence YouTube clips are similar to the above 
described category; verifiability is medium, although the meta-data question remains for 
every single clip surveyed and the potential for legal evidence is low, unless functioning 
as corroborative evidence. 
      Both the categories of Pro-Assad and Anti-Assad categories of video clips contain 
heavily edited and mediated UCG and material. In that sense the verifiability is low as 
all video-clips have lost their meta-data and are edited in a subjective matter often prop-
agandistic, mixed with dramatic music, sound effects, and other characteristics of the 
video clips that blur and remove the potential to function as legal evidence for war 
crimes. 
      For the final category of Jihadi YouTube clips, many of these clips are edited, so 
the sourcing is difficult and meta-data are unverifiable. Some video clips, especially 
done by Al Hayat Media centre, the main production company of ISIS videos, whether 
for recruitment or beheading videos, have a high production value and are scripted and 
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edited. We simply cannot determine precisely when the footage was shot on the basis of 
the videos alone. However some of these clips provide clues on who has been killed 
because victims are recognizable and sometimes named. The clips also indicate who is 
the perpetrator (the case of ‘Jihadi John’) or which organisation has been responsible. 
The public executions or beheadings of Western and Syrian journalists are recorded on 
video and uploaded on YouTube, but it cannot be legally verified for certain where this 
crime has taken place and exactly by whom.  
 
Table 2 Potential and feasibility of Syrian YouTube videos for Transitional Justice 
 
 Verifiability Probability for legal evidence 
Humour and creative non-violent resistance Very low None 
First phase of the uprisings Medium Low 
Torture and war crimes Medium  Low 
Direct frontline battle experience Medium Low 
Citizen experience of war & violence 
 
Medium Low 
Pro-Assad Very low None 






Low to medium Low to medium 
 
Based on the above exercise, we can establish that only a small number of YouTube 
videos can be used for crime-based evidence in a process of Transitional Justice. It 
seems YouTube is a notoriously weak platform for archiving of video recordings of war 
crimes due to the fact that many digital video lose their geotagged metadata in the up-
loading process. Moreover, in cases of extreme violence, the lifespan of videos is not 
long as the video clips violate YouTube’s Community Guidelines on violent and graph-
ic content. The most useful video data for legal evidence are thus not stored on 
YouTube but on the many servers, computers, hard disks and USB sticks that are in the 
hands of video activists themselves. This is the most valuable data for Transitional Jus-
tice. Other useful videos are self-incriminating video evidence, such as so-called ‘trophy 
videos’ stored on mobile phones of the perpetrators, whereby the actual perpetrator’s 
identity is clearly recognizable when carrying out the act of war crime. If the clip can be 
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corroborated on other social media platforms such as Instagram and Facebook profile 
pictures and uploads, this can form crucial evidence for tribunals and court cases. In that 
way, Transitional Justice makes use of the narcissism of an abuser. In two separate cas-
es in Sweden, Syrian men have been arrested for war crimes on the basis of uploaded 
online videos, photographs and other information on social media as well as two Swe-
dish nationals who were sentenced to life in prison after a video appeared online show-
ing them taking part in the killing of two men in Aleppo (The Local 2016).  
      Considering its weakness of verifiability, corroborative measures should be taken 
for the legal use of digital video and scholars are to be wary in using YouTube videos as 
their sole unit of analysis. Despite the challenges concerning legal verifiability of the 
videos, the uploaded UGC is still of immense knowledge value to give an insight in the 
Syrian war and form a vehicle for video activists to express their own moral outrage of 
the events happening in front of their eyes. They expressed a desire to gain attention 
from an outside audience in ‘peace land’ in the hope that some key decision makers and 
the public will take political and diplomatic action to stop the violence that they are suf-
fering. There is a clear power asymmetry between those suffering the daily mass vio-
lence on the ground in Syria and the YouTube audiences in the West. Chouliaraki 
(2008) states that the division between safety and suffering captures a fundamental as-
pect of this asymmetry in the viewing relationships of videos: 
 
“This is the asymmetry of power between the comfort of spectators in their 
living rooms and the vulnerability of sufferers on the spectators’ television 
screens. The viewing asymmetry of television does not explicitly thematize 
the economic and political divisions of our world but reflects and consoli-
dates them. Who watches and who suffers reflects the manner in which dif-
ferences in economic resources, political stability, governmental regimes and 
everyday life enter the global landscape of information. Similarly, who acts 
on whose suffering reflects patterns of economic and political agency across 
global zones of influence – North and South or East and West” - Chouliaraki 
2008. 
 
All of the video activists interviewed expressed a deep disillusionment with the apathy 
and silence and lack of collective action by Western audiences and politicians. Territo-
riality and distance play a role here (Goodenough 1997). We care more for people in 
our immediate surroundings than those whose rights are violated in far away places, in 
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other cultures with whom we cannot identify. Syrian video activists became aware of 
this selective empathy, poignantly emphasized by the remark by a Syrian Free Syrian 
Army fighter in a video where he points at a cat: 
 
“Film the animals, maybe this cat is more important to the Americans, more 
than the Syrian people, because I am sure the animals have rights in America 
more than the people here. They don’t care about us. So maybe when you are 
filming three or four cats, and put it on YouTube, maybe one million will 
watch the video, will see the video in one hour. They don’t care about the 
people. Maybe after the Americans see that, and find there is a cat here in 
Syria, I hope they will help the cat! … Maybe they will help Syria then”. – 





The enormous collection of UGC in the form of YouTube videos from the Syrian war 
provides an unprecedented and diverse collection of shared digital memories of conflict 
and violence. The central question of this article asks what the value is of UGC on 
YouTube for legal evidence of war crimes and future Transitional Justice. 	
      It is beyond doubt that the surge of uploaded videos from the Syrian uprisings revo-
lutionized the way in which contemporary wars are observed and documented. The 
sheer amount of user-generated content online has given rise to manifold ways of inter-
preting what is happening on the ground, inspired creative resistance, led to a surge of 
professional and independent Syrian documentary films and increased the connectivity 
between those who undergo the war inside the conflict zone and those who are observ-
ing the situation from a safe distance. 
      Many YouTube clips from Syria are likely to be rejected as stand-alone legal evi-
dence though, as it often lacks sourced information about meta-data, date, time, geo-
graphical coordinates, identity of the participants, the identity of the perpetrator, and 
other contextual information crucial to establishing judicial facts for war crimes prose-
cution. The ever-expanding body of videos from Syria will give rise to a wide and var-
ied landscape of interactive media that has surpassed the old approach of political main-
stream media to inform and possibly manipulate their audiences for their own agendas, 
whatever those may be. As a platform of digital memory and space to express moral 
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outrage, YouTube served a crucial and important role in the Syrian crisis and the UGC 
is of immense value for digital memorialisation and historicization of the Syrian crisis.  
      The vast amount of UGC on YouTube was categorized in 8 different types of foot-
age and we can conclude that only small number of video clips on YouTube can in fact 
function as crime-based evidence for war crimes. This does not mean that the UGC on 
YouTube has no value, however as legal evidence it can be problematic to use YouTube 
videos if not corroborated and verified properly. The main issue is the lack of meta-data 
in many of the UGC on YouTube. The YouTube video revolution in Syria did bring to 
the surface many brave video activists who are now professionally involved in produc-
ing high quality footage for international news broadcasters, the most recent example of 
that is the important work of Waad al Kataeb inside eastern Aleppo with the British 
Broadcaster Channel Four News (Channel 4 2016). Through a series of edited 5-6 mi-
nute mini stories from the ground, Al Kataeb’s work provides a credible and important 
source of evidence. 
      Furthermore, as a primary source for social research on mass violence YouTube has 
an extremely important role to play because of the unprecedented detail and scale of the 
digital recordings of the war in Syria. Developments in this field go quickly and it is 
hoped that many of the clips that have the potential to serve as legal evidence can pro-
vide crucial necessary corroborative evidence of the many war crimes currently being 
committed and permitted in Syria. It is hoped that the extreme courage, energy and ef-
forts of the many Syrian video activists who risk their lives everyday to document and 
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